










Since	 research	 was	 conducted	 on	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 Islamic	 State	 (IS)	 and	 the	 fall	 of	 Mosul	 in	 late	
2014/early	 2015	 that	 culminated	 in	 the	 writing	 of	 “The	 Enemy	Within:	 ISIS	 and	 the	 Conquest	 of	
Mosul”	 much	 has	 changed	 in	 Iraq.	 With	 varying	 degrees	 of	 success,	 the	 Iraqi	 government	 has	
managed	 to	 retake	 several	 Iraqi	 cities,	 districts	 and	 towns,	 but	 with	 forces	 that	 have	 a	 distinctly	
sectarian	hue.	Direct	 support	has	been	provided	by	 Iran	 in	 the	 form	of	weapons,	 funding,	 training	
and	military	personnel	 to	a	 range	of	Shi’i	militia	organizations.	These	organizations,	expanded	and	






of	agreement	on	air	 support	 to	 the	Hashd	al-Sha’abi.	A	 similar	picture	can	be	 seen	 in	 the	north	–	





But	 an	 assault	 on	 Mosul	 seems	 to	 be	 looming.	 ISF	 brigades	 have	 moved	 to	 Makhmour,	 Kurdish	
leaders	are	now	expressing	their	desire	to	be	involved	(arguably	for	their	own	political	reasons),	and	
there	is	a	sensitive	discussion	taking	place	between	exiled	Sunni	elites	from	Nineveh,	Salahadin,	and	
Diyala	about	the	problems	of	seeing	the	HaS	present	 in	any	retaking	of	 territory	held	by	 IS.	 It	also	
seems	that	the	Obama	administration	may	be	viewing	the	retaking	of	Mosul	as	a	 final	 ‘success’	 to	





surgically	 remove	 the	 IS	 organization	 from	 the	 city	 and	 governorate,	 when	 it	 has	 had	 some	 two	
years,	if	not	longer,	to	deepen	its	roots	into	the	socio-political	fabric	of	Mosul	and	Nineveh?	What	do	
Iraqis	 in	Mosul	 think	 about	 IS,	 and	what	 are	 their	 thoughts	 on	 the	 recapture	 of	 their	 city	 by	 the	
central	 government	 in	 Baghdad?	Would	 they	 view	 the	 recapture	 of	Mosul	 as	 liberation,	 or	 just	 a	
transition	 from	 one	 repressive	 system	 and	 back	 into	 the	 fold	 of	 another?	 How	 could	 the	 Iraqi	
government	assure	Maslawis,	as	the	people	of	Mosul	are	known,	that	the	recapture	of	Mosul	would	
benefit	 them?	 These	 questions	 are	 important.	 Every	 iteration	 of	 Arab	 Sunni	 opposition	 to	 have	











particular	 reference	 to	 their	method	of	 rule,	 the	 economic	 situation,	 and	other	 amenities	 such	 as	
health	that	are	all	part	and	parcel	of	living	within	a	state,	as	IS	claims	they	are.	The	second	section	
will	 examine	 Maslawi	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 Iraqi	 government	 and	 the	 various	 Shia	 militias,	 in	
particular	 the	 Popular	 Mobilisation	 Forces,	 particularly	 in	 light	 of	 reports	 of	 various	 atrocities	
committed	by	these	forces	in	their	recapture	of	other	cities	like	Tikrit	and	Ramadi.	The	third	section	





This	 briefing	 paper	 is	 not	 based	 on	 any	 extensive	 surveys	 conducted	 in	Mosul.	 Due	 to	 resources	
available,	 the	 security	 situation	 in	 Iraq	 and	 other	 issues	 relating	 to	 the	 conflict,	 it	 has	 not	 been	
possible	to	conduct	fieldwork	in	Iraqi	government	controlled	territory,	and	certainly	not	in	Mosul.	As	
such,	the	attitudes	surveyed	within	this	paper	come	from	a	number	of	interviews	already	conducted	
for	 the	 more	 substantive	 research	 paper	 mentioned	 above,	 and	 from	 follow-up	 interviews	
conducted	in	late	February	2016	with	the	same	respondents	as	well	as	brief	interactions	with	those	
who	have	been	recently	smuggled	out	of	Mosul.	The	paper	also	benefits	from	extensive	interviews	









As	 a	 city	 known	 for	 its	 extraordinarily	 large	 number	 of	 Iraqi	military	 and	 security	 service	 officers,	
Mosul	has	never	been	particularly	fond	of	groups	and	organisations	that	work	outside	the	confines	
of	 state	 institutions	 and	 civil	 discipline.	 Mosul	 has	 long	 been	 a	 city	 with	 disproportionate	
representation	in	the	defence	and	security	apparatus	of	the	Iraqi	state	as	compared	to	other	cities,	
even	Sunni	Arab	ones,	since	the	establishment	of	modern	Iraq	in	the	early	20th	Century.	Mosul	was	
home	 to	 Ottoman	 military	 training	 colleges,	 and	 thus	 it	 became	 the	 home	 of	 the	 Iraqi	 military	
establishment	 in	 the	 nascent	 state.	 This	 reality	 did	 not	 change	 even	 during	 the	 rule	 of	 Saddam	
Hussein	even	though	he	was	accused	of	favouring	appointments	from	his	clan	or	hometown	of	Tikrit.	






attitudes	 towards	 not	 only	 IS,	 but	 also	 al-Qaeda,	 Ansar	 al-Islam	 (a	 Kurdish	 al-Qaeda	 affiliated	
organisation)	 and	 other	 groups	 they	 did	 not	 identify	 as	 being	 sufficiently	 “Iraqi”	 or	 genuinely	
“Islamic”	 in	 their	 objectives	 and	 methods.v	 Such	 attitudes	 hearken	 back	 to	 a	 poignant	 quote	
contained	within	the	original	research	where	the	only	female	participant	stated,	“…No	one	likes	al-









wear	 their	niqab?	 You	 cannot	 even	 see	 their	 eyes,	 and	 they	 usually	 have	 to	wear	




niqab	 and	 its	 corresponding	 accoutrements,	 she	 rightly	 identified	 that	 such	 customs	 are	 alien	 to	
urban	Iraqis,	and	even	the	majority	of	rural	Iraqis	of	all	ethnicities,	including	the	Bedouin	Arabs.	The	
fact	that	she	alluded	to	the	strict	enforcement	of	female	dress	codes	in	the	Arab	Gulf	states,	likely	in	








“Yes,	 but	 also	 it	 is	 a	 lot	 deeper	 than	 that.	 Imagine	 talking	 and	 dealing	with	 those	
idiots	[IS	fighters]	on	a	daily	basis	in	order	to	acquire	the	most	basic	of	services.	Now	
imagine	 you	 hear	 that	 someone	 in	 your	 neighbourhood	 who	 was	 not	 particularly	
religious	was	 caught	 by	Da’esh	 fighters	with	 alcohol	 in	 his	 home,	 and	 that	 person	
was	not	only	executed,	but	had	his	properties	and	capital	seized.	Are	you	going	to	
want	 to	 go	 into	 your	 district	 council	 to	 make	 any	 requests?	 Even	 if	 it’s	 a	
comparatively	rare	occurrence,	that	fear	is	there.”x	
	





“You	 know	 that’s	 partially	 how	 they	 make	 their	 money,	 right?	 [IS	 earn	 money]	
through	forced	seizure	of	the	wealth	of	those	they	brand	as	‘apostates’	or	they	have	
convicted	 of	 ‘corruption	 on	 Earth’,	which	 can	mean	 anything	 depending	 on	which	
Da’esh	operative	 is	accusing	you.	Some	of	 these	charges	we	used	to	hear	about	 in	
Iran,	and	we	used	to	laugh	at	them.	Now	we’re	being	charged	with	similar	crimes	by	
judges	who	are	like	the	kind	of	idiots	who	used	to	come	through	the	Sharia	colleges	
at	 university,xi	 and	 they	 hand	out	 sentences	 no	 one	 has	 ever	 heard	 of	 being	 used	
throughout	Islamic	history.”xii	
	
According	 to	 this	 respondent	 and	others,	 IS	 judges	would	order	 for	 defendants	 of	 smaller	 crimes,	




















bombs	 being	 dropped	 on	Mosul,	 and	 there	 are	 no	medicines.	 In	 order	 to	 acquire	
certain	medicines,	they	have	to	be	bought	from	the	black	market	where	medicines	
like	simple	painkillers	and	basic	antibiotics	like	penicillin	can	cost	several	times	their	
market	 value.	 The	 risk	 to	 getting	 medicine	 that	 way	 is	 not	 only	 financial,	 but	 if	
Da’esh	catch	you	they	might	execute	you	as	a	smuggler.	Basically,	you	or	your	family	
might	 die	 from	 a	 lack	 of	 medical	 treatment,	 or	 you	 might	 die	 for	 getting	 the	





run,	 the	 properties	 they	 own,	 or	 even	 the	 state	 of	 their	 health	 that	 may	 compel	 them	 to	 seek	
medical	 supplies	 in	 black	markets	 that	may	 also	 buy	 them	 their	 own	deaths.	What	 appears	 to	 be	
common	amongst	all	respondents	 is	a	fear	of	what	might	happen	to	them	if	they	break	any	of	 IS’s	






as	being	 from	their	 immediate	community	as	perhaps	being	as	high	as	90	percent,	with	 some	5-6	
percent	 then	 coming	 from	 other	 parts	 of	 Iraq	 or	 Syria,	 and	 a	 much	 smaller	 percentage	 being	
‘foreign’.	If	these	numbers	are	correct,	and	the	pattern	is	replicated	to	some	degree	in	Mosul,	then	










sectarian	Shia	organisations	as	being	any	different	 from	 IS.	The	people	of	Mosul,	 it	 seems,	do	not	
deviate	from	this	formula.	The	primary	fear	of	Maslawis	appears	to	be	not	continued	IS	rule,	but	a	
vengeful	 Shia	 army	 descending	 onto	 the	 city,	 branding	 the	 people	 as	 IS	 collaborators	 and	
sympathisers,	 and	 commencing	 a	 sectarian	 and	 genocidal	 campaign	of	 imprisonment,	 torture	 and	
murder.	 Few	 Sunni	 Arabs,	 especially	 in	 Mosul,	 will	 forget	 that	 Iraqi	 Security	 Forces	 committed	
extrajudicial	murder	of	Sunni	detainees	as	they	withdrew	in	the	face	of	IS	advances.xvii	Similarly,	few	
can	 forget	 the	graphic	 scenes	of	 Sunnis	murdered	by	Shia	 terrorist	organisations	being	hung	 from	





The	 words	 frequently	 used	 to	 describe	 what	 the	 people	 of	 Mosul	 expect	 from	 “liberating”	 Iraqi	
government	 and	 allied	 Popular	Mobilisation	 forces	 in	 Arabic	were	mathbaha,	 ibada,	majzara	 and	




Da’esh’s	murder	of	anyone	who	contradicted	or	 resisted	 them,	even	non-violently.	But	what’s	 the	
difference	 between	 them	 and	 the	 government	 and	 its	 bloodthirsty	 gangs?	Not	 a	 single	 one	 of	 us	
[Sunnis]	 hasn’t	 lost	 someone	 to	 their	 bullets,	 blades	 and	 drills”,xxi	 said	 the	 same	 respondent	 in	
reference	 to	 the	 heavily	 documented	 use	 of	 power	 drills	 by	 Shia	militias	 to	 torture	 and	 kill	 Sunni	
detainees	and	hostages.		
	
Such	misgivings	 towards	Baghdad	and	 its	 allies	were	not	 limited	 to	 the	expression	of	 fear	of	 lives	
being	lost,	but	also	with	regard	to	women’s	rights.	Two	respondents,	both	female,	recounted	stories	
of	 how	widows	 in	 Sunni	 areas	 in	Baghdad	 and	other	 cities	were	 forced	 into	muta’a	marriages,	 or	
temporary	marriages	permitted	in	Shia	 Islam,	 in	order	to	be	able	to	provide	for	their	families	after	
the	main	breadwinners	were	killed.xxii	While	 IS	has	gained	notoriety	 for	 its	 sexual	exploitation	and	
enslavement	of	women,	Shia	militias	have	also	been	known	to	be	involved	in	the	trafficking	of	Iraqi	




“We	 know	what	 happened	 to	many	 of	 those	 poor	 widows	 in	 Baghdad.	 [The	 Shia	
militias]	 have	 even	 set	 up	 brothels	 that	 have	 dozens	 of	 these	 widows	 in	 each	
location,	with	muta’a	marriages	being	officiated	by	 in-house	 Shia	 imams	who	give	
their	blessings	 to	 the	exploitation	of	 innocent	women	and	girls.	 If	 the	Shia	militias	




already	 been	 occurring	 extensively	 in	 Iraq	 since	 2003.	 Although	 the	 Iraqi	 Shia	 religious	
establishment’s	 approval	 of	 muta’a	 has	 scarcely	 been	 reported	 in	 the	 media,xxv	 it	 cannot	 have	











will	 commit	 genocide	 against	 us?	 They	 need	 to	 stop	 thinking	 of	 themselves	 as	
heroes	that	are	there	to	slay	monsters	and	banish	nightmares	that	they	created.”xxvii	
	
Whilst	 this	 quote	 can	 also	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 following	 section	 on	 the	 international	 community,	 it	
demonstrates	 that	many	Sunni	Arabs	believe	 that	 a	 return	 to	Baghdad’s	 control	would	be	akin	 to	
handing	over	the	fates	of	the	population	to	a	government	that	will	either	take	part	in	or	else	turn	a	










the	 international	 community,	 particularly	 the	 US	 and	 the	 wider	 institutions	 of	 the	 UN.	 The	 US	
invasion	in	2003	is	viewed	as	the	“original	sin”	that	led	to	what	the	respondents	feel	is	the	wholesale	
destruction	 of	 Iraq	 as	 a	 state	 and	 society.	 Many	 of	 the	 respondents	 felt	 that	 the	 US	 had	 simply	
handed	Iraq	over	to	Iran	“on	a	golden	platter”,xxviii	as	one	respondent	worded	it,	and	that	under	the	
Ba’athists	 they	 at	 least	 had	 livelihoods,	 their	 families	 and	 security,	 even	 if	 they	 lacked	 political	
freedom.		
	
While	 blaming	 the	 West	 has	 already	 been	 heavily	 covered	 in	 numerous	 publications,	 what	 is	 of	
primary	 importance	 and	 utility	 to	 this	 enquiry	 is	 how	 Maslawis	 perceive	 the	 ability	 of	 the	
international	 community,	 especially	 regional	 powers	 such	 as	 Turkey	 and	 Saudi	 Arabia,	 to	 play	 a	
positive	 role	 in	 Iraq’s	 future.	 Although	 they	 saw	 the	 US,	 Britain,	 Turkey	 and	 Saudi	 Arabia	 as	 all	















entrance	 into	 regaining	 the	 trust	 of	 Iraqis,	 particularly	 Sunni	 Arabs	who	 feel	 that	 they	 have	 been	
marginalised	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 Shia	Arabs	 and	 Kurds	who	obviously	 benefited	 the	most	 from	 the	
2003	 invasion.	 These	 sentiments	were	 echoed	 by	many	 other	 respondents,	 and	 they	 believe	 that	






































Why	 is	 this	 important	 for	day	after	scenarios	 in	Mosul.	 In	short,	any	notion	of	a	Kurdish	territorial	







As	 the	 above	 survey	 shows,	 the	 people	 of	 Mosul	 are	 extremely	 fearful	 of	 a	 post-IS	 Mosul.	 The	
respondents	 firmly	 believe	 that	 the	 Iraqi	 government	 and	 its	 allied	 Shia	 militias,	 particularly	 the	
Popular	Mobilisation	Forces,	will	not	have	liberation	in	mind	when	they	attempt	to	recapture	Mosul,	
but	vengeance.	The	Popular	Mobilisation	Forces	have	frequently	perpetrated	brutal	excesses	against	
the	Sunni	population,	whether	 in	Tikrit,	Ramadi,	 Tal	Afar,	 Jurf	 al-Sakhr,	Muqdadiya	or	many	other	
places,	and	Maslawis	are	acutely	aware	of	this.	They	believe,	and	not	without	good	reason,	that	the	
sectarianism	that	 is	 rampant	and	pervasive	 in	both	the	Popular	Mobilisation	and	the	 Iraqi	Security	
Forces	will	 lead	these	“liberating”	forces	to	accuse	the	Maslawis,	 themselves	victims	of	 IS	violence	
and	oppression,	of	being	IS	sympathisers	or	collaborators.	As	many	have	seen	in	the	Shia	on	Sunni	
violence	 in	 Diyala,	 it	 is	 usually	 enough	 to	 be	 Sunni	 to	 be	 accused	 of	 being	 an	 IS	 collaborator	 and	
killed	for	it.	
	
However,	 it	 is	 also	 clear	 that	 they	 feel	 strong	 anti-IS	 sentiments	 and	wish	 to	 see	 them	 gone	 and	
replaced,	as	long	as	it	is	not	replacing	IS	tyranny	with	a	return	to	the	tyranny	of	Baghdad’s	sectarian	
policies	 and	 the	 free	 rein	 granted	 to	 sectarian	 Shia	 militias	 and	 organisations	 that	 are	 directly	
supported	and	controlled	by	Iran.	What	is	interesting	is	that,	although	they	blame	the	international	
community	 and	particularly	 the	US	 and	 its	 allies	 for	 the	 situation	 of	 Iraq	 today,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	
people	 of	 Mosul	 would	 support	 an	 international	 force,	 including	 Arab	 and	 Turkish	 soldiers,	 in	
securing	the	city	after	IS	is	forced	to	withdraw.	This	is	because	they	see	this	as	the	best	solution	to	
ensuring	 that	 the	 Iraqi	 Security	 Forces	 and	 Popular	 Mobilisation	 Forces	 will	 be	 restrained	 from	








in	 Iraq,	 even	 if	 it	 is	 a	 peacekeeping	 operation,	 is	 highly	 debatable.	 However,	 without	 such	 a	
peacekeeping	mission,	 the	world	 risks	 very	 recent	history	 repeating	 itself	 in	 Iraq.	 Just	 as	al-Qaeda	
spawned	IS,	a	mutated	and	even	more	extreme	version	of	itself,	no	one	can	be	certain	about	what	IS	
may	 bring	 forth	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 its	 defeat,	 and	 indeed	 if	 such	 an	 organisation	 will	 be	 even	more	
violent,	even	more	capricious	and	even	more	brutal	than	IS	 itself.	Such	a	scenario	 is	one	that	does	
not	 bear	 thinking	 about,	 yet	 the	 international	 community	must	 consider	 it	 deeply	 if	 they	wish	 to	
restore	 order	 to	 the	 region	 and	 begin	 to	 curtail	 the	 rise	 and	 propagation	 of	 violent	 extremist	
organisations,	Sunni,	Shia	or	otherwise.	
	




v	 The	 respondents	 include	 all	 participants	 interviewed	 for	 “The	 Enemy	 Within:	 ISIS	 and	 the	 Conquest	 of	










xi	 This	 is	 in	 reference	 to	 the	 unfortunate	 fact	 that,	 throughout	 the	 Arab	 world,	 those	 with	 the	 weakest	
secondary	education	grades	were	admitted	onto	Sharia	courses	at	university.	As	such,	rather	than	the	best	and	
brightest	students	studying	Islamic	law,	the	lowest	percentiles	of	students	were	admitted	to	study	what	is	still	
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